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Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. has experienced relatively sluggish public 
adoption of spread-reduction measures. There is a growing narrative that political rhetoric 
undercutting the scientific community and its recommendations is the very reason compliance 
with public health recommendations has been so challenging to secure. Further, there is concern 
that this brand of rhetoric hurts public trust in scientists on a general level. This thesis represents 
an attempt to test the causal link identified in the statements above. 
 
Research questions: Does political rhetoric attacking scientists and their recommendations 
truly affect public perceptions of competence, beneficence, and trustworthiness? And does that 
rhetoric indeed reduce compliance with recommendations? 
 
The predominant hypotheses of this thesis are as follows: 
 
1) Rhetoric that attacks and/or undercuts scientific sources will negatively impact public 
perception of both scientists—the “attacked”—and politicians—the “attackers”—on 
dimensions of competence, beneficence, and trustworthiness. 
 
2) When receiving public health messaging, attitude expressed toward science is 
consequential—i.e., it matters—to listeners. 
 
These questions and hypotheses were explored and tested via a two-part survey 
experiment launched on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The first part of the survey leverages a 23 
factorial design, in which the factors are: 1) factual consensus; 2) speaker party; and 3) ad 
hominem praise/attack behavior. After exposure to stimuli varying along these dimensions, 
participants rated their perceptions of the trustworthiness, beneficence, and competence of a 
scientist and politician. The second part of the survey leverages a conjoint design, in which the 
attributes are 1) Source; 2) Justification; and 3) Attitude toward science. Participants were 
presented with a public health recommendation followed by speaker profiles varying randomly 
along the attributes above. They were tasked with selecting which speaker they would be most 
willing to listen to if deciding whether or not to follow the public health recommendation. 
Through the factorial experiment, Hypothesis (1) was partially supported. Attack rhetoric 
negatively impacted participant perceptions of politicians (“attackers”), but had minimal effect 
on participant perceptions of scientists. However, subgroup analysis revealed that certain 
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characteristics make participants more susceptible to be swayed in their opinions by attack 
rhetoric. 
Through the conjoint experiment, Hypothesis (2) was supported. The attitude speakers 
expressed toward scientists and their role in public health policy-making was the most important 
relative factor for respondents when choosing between profiles. Respondents preferred scientific 
speakers to political ones, and had a strong preference for speakers who felt either neutral or very 
positive toward scientists in the policy-making arena.  
 5 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... 2 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 3 
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................... 5 
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................. 7 
1.1: Context and Motivation.............................................................................................................. 7 
1.2: Research Questions and Hypotheses ........................................................................................ 11 
1.3: Structure ................................................................................................................................... 11 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ................................................................................................... 12 
2.1: The Representative vs. The Technocrat ................................................................................... 12 
2.2: The Politician vs. The Scientist ................................................................................................ 17 
2.3: Political Trust ........................................................................................................................... 19 
2.4: Trust in Experts ........................................................................................................................ 21 
2.5: Political Communication .......................................................................................................... 22 
The Listener: Individual-Level Psychology ...................................................................................................22 
The Speaker: Rhetorical Techniques and Trends ..........................................................................................23 
Attack Rhetoric ............................................................................................................................................26 
Chapter 3: Survey Experiment Methodology ........................................................................... 28 
3.1: Survey Experiment Description ............................................................................................... 28 
3.2: Platforms: Conjoint.ly and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk ........................................................ 28 
3.3: Part I—Factorial Design .......................................................................................................... 31 
3.4: Part II—Conjoint Design ......................................................................................................... 33 
3.5: Demographic and Baseline Questions ...................................................................................... 36 
3.6: Data Output and Analysis ........................................................................................................ 37 
3.7: Quality Assurance .................................................................................................................... 41 
3.8: Ethical Considerations ............................................................................................................. 42 
Chapter 4: Results .................................................................................................................... 43 
4.1: Sample Characteristics ............................................................................................................. 43 
4.2: Part I—Factorial Survey Experiment...................................................................................... 43 
4.3: Part II—Conjoint Survey Experiment .................................................................................... 47 
Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion .................................................................................... 53 
5.1: Main Findings ........................................................................................................................... 53 
Hypothesis (1) and Factorial Results ............................................................................................................53 
Hypothesis (2) and Conjoint Results .............................................................................................................59 
5.2: Summary and Further Research ............................................................................................. 59 
 6 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 61 
APPENDIX .............................................................................................................................. 69 
A. Soft Launch on MTurk ........................................................................................................... 69 
B. Sample Demographics ............................................................................................................. 72 
C. Factorial Experiment: Mean Responses by Conditions ......................................................... 75 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1: Context and Motivation 
Recounting the progression of the coronavirus pandemic here is perhaps a trite exercise––
most readers are likely all too well acquainted with these events. No one will soon forget the 
announcement of the first U.S. COVID-19 case in late January 2020; nor the flurry of travel 
restrictions, pandemic declarations, and establishment closures that ensued. In parallel with the 
rising number of infected patients seeking care, medical professionals soon found themselves 
struggling to cope with equipment shortages as the scientific community began searching for 
treatments. The White House jumped into the fray, forming the Coronavirus Task Force and 
entrusting the lead on public health recommendations to a team comprised of technocrats, 
bureaucrats, and elected officials. 
However, even while receiving jarring statistics of case numbers in the hundreds of 
thousands and a death toll on the rise, the American public struggled to comply with spread-
reduction measures. In early April, wearing face masks became an official CDC 
recommendation; and yet, merely one quarter of Americans regularly donned them at that time 
(Morning Consult National Tracking Poll #200415). As the pandemic progressed, the US proved 
to be slower to adopt public health recommendations than were many global counterparts 
(Aravindakshan et al. 2020). 
Failed leadership is often one of the factors to which this lagging compliance has been 
attributed. In a New England Journal of Medicine article titled “Dying in a Leadership Vacuum,” 
editors of the prominent publication state that government decision-makers “have taken a crisis 
and turned it into a tragedy” (New England Journal of Medicine 2020). The Trump 
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administration came under fire for failing to implement a standardized national approach to 
spread-reduction, instead granting governors latitude to “call [their] own shots” while 
simultaneously tweeting appeals to “LIBERATE!” various locked-down states (Shear and 
Mervosh 2020). Even when expectations for behavior were clear (i.e., stay at home; wear a 
mask; practice social distancing), regulations were often not enforced as vehemently as they 
were in other countries (Calder 2020). In the words of New York Times reporter Donald McNeil, 
the U.S. stay-at-home orders looked like a “giant garden party” relative to the stringent 
distancing practices found abroad (Davies 2020). Even high-level officials joined in the 
inauspicious fête, frequently failing to model behavior in line with their own recommendations. 
Stanford researchers estimated that over 30,000 new cases originated from pre-election Trump 
rallies (Lovelace Jr. 2020); and the Trump team made various public appearances without masks 
in September, six months into the pandemic (Bloomberg 2020). 
Further undermining compliance with public health recommendations has been the issue 
of rampant misinformation. At the outset of the pandemic, nearly 50% of Americans reported 
seeing at least some “made-up news” regarding COVID-19, predominantly stories that they 
believed either exaggerated or underplayed risk levels, or presented misleading details about the 
virus (Mitchell and Oliphant 2020). For example, more than 50% of U.S. adults were uninformed 
about the origins of COVID-19, reporting their belief that it was either manufactured in a lab or 
that they were “not sure” (Mitchell and Oliphant 2020). Interpretations of information often 
conformed to the contour of partisan lines, with Republicans more than twice as likely as 
Democrats to believe the media has “greatly exaggerated” the virus’s risks (Mitchell and 
Oliphant 2020). 
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In some respects, the confusion around accurate information could be explained by a 
natural byproduct of the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” search for truth: erroneous 
statements (NYTimes v. Sullivan). Perhaps the race for correct answers in a time-sensitive, high-
stakes situation yielded a deluge of generally well-intentioned information—some sound, some 
not—that proved difficult to sift through quickly.  
However, this explanation appears to lose a great deal of traction as the pandemic has 
progressed. In many instances, even with plentiful opportunities to guide the public through the 
weeds toward reliable fact, national politicians promoted falsehood. The rhetoric of the Trump 
administration regularly hyped—or, at the very least, left the door open to—unsubstantiated, 
racially-charged origin myths. Despite prevailing scientific opinion to the contrary, the former 
president repeated the belief that COVID-19 had been released from a lab in Wuhan (Healy 
2020). Additionally, he admitted on tape that he knowingly underplayed the virus’s severity 
when he compared it to the flu (Haberman 2020). 
As the Trump administration propagated false or misleading information, their rhetoric 
brought the scientific community and their recommendations under fire. President Trump 
claimed the virus was the Democrats’ “new hoax” after their failure to oust him with an 
investigation into his ties with Russia (Haberman 2020), while scientific evidence very clearly 
pointed to the virus’s legitimacy. The former president also off-handedly suggested that injecting 
oneself with disinfectant could be “interesting to check” as a treatment method, a statement 
prompting frantic corrections from scientists warning of fatal effects (BBC 2020).  
Many attacks on the scientific community went beyond disagreement with their 
recommendations, and the NIH’s Dr. Anthony Fauci often found himself on the receiving end of 
the ad hominem hits. Trump branded Fauci an “idiot” and “disaster” who has “been here for 500 
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years” (Collins and Liptak 2020). A leaked memo from the White House revealed that some 
members of the administration were “concerned about the number of times Dr. Fauci has been 
wrong on things” (KHN 2020). At the same time, two White House sources told ABC News that 
Trump aides occasionally referred to the nation’s leading infectious disease expert pejoratively 
as “Dr. Doom and Gloom” (KHN 2020).  
President Trump defended his pushback on the scientific community, positing that if 
Fauci were running the country, “we’d have 500,000 deaths” (Collins and Liptak 2020). “People 
are tired of COVID,” Trump stated on a call with campaign staff. “People are saying whatever. 
Just leave us alone…People are tired of hearing Fauci and all these idiots” (Collins and Liptak 
2020). His attitude toward scientists became something of a campaigning tool—at a rally in 
Nevada, he lamented that, if elected, “Biden will listen to the scientists” (Collins and Liptak 
2020). 
It is even more concerning to consider, as many have, that these comments may have 
costs more substantial than a few raised eyebrows and hurt professional feelings. The New 
England Journal of Medicine identifies Trump’s rhetoric as the very reason compliance with 
public health recommendations has been so challenging to secure: “People simply don’t wear 
masks, largely because our leaders have stated outright that masks are political tools rather than 
effective infection control measures” (New England Journal of Medicine 2020). And beyond 
concerns over compliance with scientific recommendations, there is a growing narrative that this 
brand of rhetoric hurts public trust in scientists on a general level. “The government has 
appropriately invested heavily in vaccine development,” the NEJM editorial continues, “but its 
rhetoric has politicized the development process and led to growing public distrust” (New 
England Journal of Medicine 2020). 
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1.2: Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This thesis represents an attempt to test the causal link identified in the statements above. 
Research questions: Does political rhetoric attacking scientists and their recommendations truly 
affect public perceptions of competence, beneficence, and trustworthiness? And does that rhetoric 
indeed reduce compliance with recommendations? 
 
If so, we might reconsider what politicians can, or rather should, say in a crisis situation; 
and we might wonder why we trust politicians more than experts in a public health setting. On 
the other hand, if attack rhetoric does not affect trust or compliance, we might consider why we, 
a society passionate about self-governance, turn to technocrats over our elected officials. 
The predominant hypotheses of this thesis are as follows: 
3) Rhetoric that attacks and/or undercuts scientific sources will negatively impact public 
perception of both scientists—the “attacked”—and politicians—the “attackers”—on 
dimensions of competence, beneficence, and trustworthiness. 
 
4) When receiving public health messaging, attitude expressed toward science is 
consequential—i.e., it matters—to listeners. 
 
1.3: Structure 
My exploration of these questions and hypotheses is broken into several sections, the first 
of which will provide an account of the existing literature on party and technocratic governance; 
political trust; and political communication—all texts from which the hypotheses above emerge. 
The second section will explore the methodological approaches involved in a two-part survey 
experiment designed and launched on a crowdsourcing site to explore this thesis’s research 
questions and test its hypotheses on an individual-respondent level. The third and fourth sections 
will present and discuss, respectively, the results of the survey experiment. A summary and 
potential avenues of further research will close. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
 
2.1: The Representative vs. The Technocrat 
 
Tackling a topic such as this one necessitates first considering a fundamental question: 
who do we, as a society, want to see making consequential decisions in government? It is 
common knowledge that various political decision-making models exist across the globe—from 
autocracy, theocracy, and monarchy, to republicanism and democracy, all of which champion 
different people and/or entities as the foremost authorities. Relevant to this thesis’s exploration 
are the governmental forms of 1) party-driven democracy and 2) technocracy.  
Party-driven democracy rests decision-making capabilities with elected representatives. 
These representatives are mediators between the people they serve and the institutions that 
govern; and as such, they are tasked with balancing responsiveness to constituents with 
responsibility (i.e., governing) (Caramini 2017). There is an increasingly-loud narrative that 
representative democracy falls short on those two dimensions, instead prone to self-interested 
political choices made with an eye toward re-election rather than constituent demands, and 
partisan wars that put the governing process in a chokehold. As of March 2019, a meager 17% of 
the American public trusted the federal government “to do what is right” either “just about 
always” or “most of the time.” But perhaps even more concerning than this stand-alone figure is 
the trend it represents. From one of Pew Research’s long-running studies, public trust has been 
declining relatively consistently since the 1960s, with a slight recovery in the 2000s followed by 
another plunge within the next decade (Figure 1; Pew Research 2019). Thus, though the 
representative model was intended to marry the people and the experts—to ensure a voice for the 
masses (i.e., through the vote) while reaping the benefits of elite, skilled leaders (i.e., elected 
politicians)—its perceived lack of responsiveness and effectiveness have proven the union 
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imperfect. Representative party democracy has therefore been left exposed to challenges directly 
from the groups it sought to join together: the people, armed with a populist ideology, and the 
elites, armed with a technocratic ideology (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Caramini 2017; 
Bertsou and Caramini 2020). 
 
Figure 1: Declining trust in federal government since the 1960s. 
 
Though the populist challenge to party democracy is important, a discussion of the latter 
challenge, technocracy, is most salient to the aims of this thesis. Technocracy places decision-
making responsibilities with “experts” who are “objective” in their recognition of public 
problems and their enactment of fixes (Caramini 2017; Bertsou and Pastorella 2017). The non-
partisan, independent nature of technocratic governance aims to minimize partisan inefficiencies 
(ex., gridlock) often characteristic of representative systems. Most directly, technocratic 
decision-making works to eliminate politically/electorally favorable but rationally ill-advised 
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choices (Caramini 2017). These goals culminate in what has been termed the “technocratic 
wish”: “the expectation and hope that contentious issues in public life can be resolved by appeal 
to scientific measures and procedures rather than by the wise judgement of selected individuals” 
(Belkin 1997: 518). Notable examples of technocratic governance emerge most often in the 
realms of economic- and health-oriented policymaking, particularly in Latin America (e.g., 
Dargent 2020), Europe, and China (Otto 2020). 
While technocracy may sound like a straightforward fix to the stumbles of representative 
party government, the literature warns of two major caveats: 1) accountability and 2) 
politicization. Technocracy is “unaccountable” in the sense that unelected experts do not govern 
with the backing of a mandate. In the absence of voting feedback, it is difficult to determine 
whether the technocrat is acting how he/she claims to act. Further, even if voters were involved 
in surveilling their governing technocrats, a layperson would be hard-pressed to correctly judge 
the value of complex, specialized decisions the technocrat was charged with making. Regarding 
politicization of technocracy, it is important to make the distinction between the non-partisan and 
the apolitical. Though technocracy may be non-partisan in that it does not subscribe to 
representative political parties, it can never be fully neutral. The concept of technocracy goes 
beyond implementation of, for example, democratically-formed policies. It involves technocrats 
setting goals and making decisions (i.e., wielding governing power), and is thus fundamentally 
political in addition to being unaccountable to a popular mandate (Bertsou and Caramini 2020). 
For example, Nobel Prize-winning economist and Columbia University professor Joseph Stiglitz 
points out that the recommendations of IMF-backed economic experts forming policies for 
developing countries “are more often based on ideology than economic science,” because, by 
necessity, “some policies are better for some groups, but worse for others” (Stiglitz 2003). 
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Despite these warnings, while trust in the American federal government is hovering 
around all-time lows, public trust in one of the most prolific types of technocrats—scientists—
have neared historic highs. In 2019, the percentage of U.S. adults who had a “great deal” or “fair 
amount” of confidence in medical scientists to “act in the best interests of the public” was more 
than double the percentage for elected officials (86% vs. 35%). Further, respondents deemed 
medical scientists the most trustworthy out of all of the other groups about which they were 
asked (Figure 2; Pew Research 2019). 
 
Figure 2: American public holds high trust for scientists and medical scientists. 
 
The simultaneous rise in public trust in scientists and decline in public trust in 
representative political institutions is a trend with empirical backing. A European study from 
Bertsou and Pastorella (2017) found a negative relationship between citizens’ preference for 
technocrats and their trust in parties or other representative political institutions (Bertsou and 
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Pastorella 2017). The picture that these findings paint is one of a “zero-sum game”—namely, as 
technocrats accrue public goodwill, representatives will lose theirs in degrees (and vice versa) 
(Lobo and McManus 2020). And so a natural tension emerges between the politician and the 
technocrat. 
Though engaged in this dogged give-and-take of power, technocrats and politicians 
nearly always find themselves working in close quarters on governance issues. Caramini (2020) 
points out that empirical models are not fully democratic or fully technocratic—instead, most (if 
not all) case studies show that representative politicians and technocrats tend to coexist in the 
governance process (Bertsou and Caramini 2020). And perhaps coexistence is for the best: both 
groups indisputably generate benefits in the policy-making process. For example, leaving 
sensitive decisions to the data-driven experts yields elected representatives the benefit of hedging 
against backlash toward politically unpopular decisions (Syrett 2003). Additionally, technocrats 
can constitute a powerful solution to a political “legitimacy problem,” which arises in priority-
setting in specialized arenas such as healthcare and economics (Syrett 2003). However, 
technocratic legitimacy is achieved only when their “independent” choices are properly shielded 
from political influence (and the appearance of it) (Syrett 2003). This type of insulation is 
challenging to implement; and so, most often, “the political issues are still there, even when they 
are addressed indirectly using the language of technique and evidence” (Rodwin 2001: 442). 
Ultimately, it seems clear that, though we may try to separate them, the entanglement between 





2.2: The Politician vs. The Scientist 
  
A specific type of technocrat—the scientist—has often found himself at the forefront of 
political tensions within a multitude of policy and ideological debates, with some of the most 
notable being climate, science education, reproductive rights, and vaccination. Though we may 
try to separate science from politics, “science is now central to most of our major policy 
challenges. Segregating it has, in effect, taken a large portion of the political discussion off the 
table. No other major human endeavor is so ghettoized” (Otto 2011: 12). Science is truth-
driven—its findings do not often conform cleanly to subjective partisan platforms. Therefore, 
where scientific evidence diverges from party claims, it often ends up constituting a direct threat 
to political authority. Specifically, conflicts often arise when certain scientifically-backed 
concepts are at odds with ideological, moral, or financial political interests. For example, 
aversion to proactive climate policy could be linked to a politician’s reliance on the energy 
industry’s monetary contributions, and to an emphasis on strong economy (even at the expense 
of industrial pollution). Sarah Palin’s proposal in a 2006 gubernatorial race to teach Creationism 
in conjunction with evolution in schools can be seen as tied directly to the religious backbone of 
her political persona (Otto 2011). Stances on abortions and reproductive rights are similarly 
enshrined in an amalgam of religious trappings (Otto 2011). 
Vaccination controversy holds an eminent position in the American anti-science 
movement. In the late 1990s, British surgeon Andrew Wakefield published a study in a reputable 
journal tying MMR vaccines to the subsequent development of autism in young children. 
Though the results of the study were later revealed to be fraudulent, the data garnered 
mainstream attention—the link between vaccination and autism was propagated by celebrities 
such as Jenny McCarthy and Robert F. Kennedy Jr. Though surely validating for niche groups 
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such as Christian Scientists, it is perhaps surprising to note that vaccine resistance gained 
strongest traction among the people we might consider less-otherized: upper-middle class, 
university-educated parents (Otto 2011: 153).  
And just as anti-vaccine beliefs do not always conform strictly to particular demographic 
indicators, anti-science stances do not belong exclusively to a single political party. With 
outspoken examples such as Palin, Bush, and Trump, the GOP has received much attention for 
promotion of the anti-science tradition. However, as Otto discusses, the Democratic Party cannot 
be called a consistent friend to the scientific community. “Though Democrats as a party had not 
taken any political stances against science, the political left was suffering from a cultural retreat 
from it just the same” (Otto 2011: 17). The Democrats’ “cultural retreat” on which Otto remarks 
is exemplified by what he perceives as a tendency to avoid scientific questions wherever possible 
for fear of putting off “fundamentalist swing voters” (Otto 2011: 18). 
In addition to rejection or misuse of scientific findings in specific issues areas, also 
present is a generalized fear of the “elites” seizing control of or abusing the masses (Otto 2011; 
Rigney 1991). That anti-elitist sentiment has been a long-standing part of the American 
consciousness is evident as early as the 1960s. Eisenhower gave a 1961 warning to the American 
people to beware of the “military-industrial complex” that threatened a democratic way of life: 
“we must…be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the 
captive of a scientific-technological elite” (Otto 2011: 90). 
The battle between politicians and experts has led facts to do the uncanny—to turn 
subjective. And when the facts are subjective and narratives on important issues vary widely, the 
question of who we turn to—who we trust when we make decisions about ourselves, our 
families, our livelihoods, our finances—comes to the forefront. 
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2.3: Political Trust 
 
Trust is defined in political science literature as a tripartite concept: “A trusts B to do x 
(or with respect to matters x)” (Hardin 2003: 12). It is also represented as a form of 
“encapsulated interest,” the notion that one’s trust for another person is rooted in the truster’s 
assessment of how beneficial it would be for the trustee personally to keep up his/her end of the 
bargain (i.e., “My trust in you is typically encapsulated in your interest in fulfilling my trust” 
(Hardin 2003: 12)). Trust in the political system can be broken down along two dimensions—
trust in individual agents (i.e., politicians, bureaucrats…) and trust in institutions (i.e., Supreme 
Court, Congress). 
The emphasis placed on creating trust in governance can be traced back to the formation 
of the Constitution. One premise of representative government was fundamentally to ensure that 
voters could choose ‘one of their own’—someone they could trust to advocate for their needs 
and wants. Further, institutional arrangements—ex., frequent voting cycles, checks and 
balances—shore up politicians’ encapsulated interest in maintaining constituent trust (Hardin 
2003; Levi 2003). 
But how important is political trust in a democracy? The answers to this question vary 
widely in existing literature. Hardin (2003) argues that citizen trust in government at the 
individual level is not essential for a functional state—instead, trustworthiness of governing 
institutions is sufficient. Namely, agents need only be incentivized to fulfill a trust (not 
necessarily that of each constituent, but perhaps, e.g., the trust of the institution paying his/her 
salary instead) (Hardin 2003). Further, it can be argued that healthy representative democracy 
always involves a degree of mistrust, also termed political skepticism. A skeptical citizenry is an 
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involved citizenry that monitors elected officials and holds them to their promises (van der Meer 
and Zmerli 2017). 
In contrast, there are compelling arguments that trust between the government and the 
governed is paramount: it is the “glue that keeps the system together and…the oil that lubricates 
the policy machine” (van der Meer and Zmerli 2017: 1). Trustworthy institutions are tied to 
contingent consent, defined as “behavioral compliance with government demands even when an 
individual’s costs somewhat exceed her individual benefits and even in the absence of strong 
ideological convictions that make costs totally irrelevant” (Levi 2003: 88). Put simply, citizen 
trust in government should beget constituent obedience, even when compliance is costly 
(Cairney and Wellstead 2021). Thus, trust is a pathway to influence and legitimacy (Citrin and 
Stoker 2018). The implications of this concept in a COVID-19 context are salient as governing 
institutions ask Americans to take many actions for the public good that are costly at the 
individual level (financially and otherwise). If Levi, van der Meer, and Zmerli’s narrative are 
correct, citizen trust should be more important in a crisis setting than ever. 
But the literature and public opinion data warns of another “crisis” paralleling the 
pandemic: a crisis of political trust in the United States. As discussed in an earlier section and as 
shown in Figure 1, Americans have been steadily losing faith in the federal government since the 
1960s—not only do citizens have less trust in government to do right, but they also feel less 
inclined to believe that officials care and that the government benefits all (Pew 2019; Dalton 
2017). In 2012, The Economist attributed lack of trust in governance “above all, to the public 
losing faith in political leaders,” leaders who, according to philosopher Zigmunt Bauman, “are 
not just corrupt or stupid, but inept…The current crisis of democracy is a crisis of democratic 
institutions” (van der Meer and Zmerli 2017: 2). Instead of the mistrust that characterizes a 
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vigilant and involved democratic citizenry, the United States seems to be suffering from distrust: 
political cynicism that gives rise to anti-system shifts (van der Meer and Zmerli 2017).  
These trends—declining trust in political figures and institutions and increasing trust in 
technocrats—urge a search for answers: how did we get here? Levi (2003) identifies “promise 
breaking, incompetence, and the antagonism of government actors toward those they are 
supposed to serve” as crucial origins of distrust (Levi 2003: 88). “Citizens are likely to trust 
government only to the extent that they believe that it will act in their interests, that its 
procedures are fair, and that their trust of the state and of others is reciprocated” (Levi 2003: 88). 
 
2.4: Trust in Experts 
Aggregate opinion data tell us that public trust in scientists is quite high—as noted 
earlier, Pew Research reported 86% of respondents trust scientists to act in the best interest of the 
public; and polls from Ipsos MORI seconded this finding (Pew 2019; Ipsos MORI 2019). 
However, even marginal mistrust or distrust directed toward experts in crisis situations has the 
potential to wreak havoc on public well-being. Trust can be immensely important in the context 
of emergency response because, as is the case in the U.S., mitigation efforts are based by and 
large on voluntary compliance of citizens, and compliance hinges on trust (Bennett 2020; Levi 
2003).  
The trust that the people place in experts when adhering to public health 
recommendations is termed recommendation trust. It is distinct from other forms of trust, in that 
convincing the public to obey a recommendation is harder than convincing them to believe, 
passively, in a technical fact. The bar is higher when it comes to recommendation trust: “When 
science leads policy, it must work harder to merit public trust” (Bennett 2020: 244). There are 
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three conditions required to secure recommendation trust from the public: 1) the expert must be 
sincere and 2) competent in his/her field, and 3) the action recommended should be perceived as 
made in the citizens’ best interest (Bennett 2020). 
 But what happens when these conditions are not met? What happens when the expert is 
perceived as incompetent? What happens when the expert is perceived as politically motivated 
rather than sincere or well-intentioned? If Bennett’s framework is correct, recommendation trust 
would be undermined and public health efforts would be severely hampered. As documented in 
Cairney and Wellstead (2021), the Trump administration verbally attacked the trustworthiness of 
leading public health experts throughout the pandemic. Anti-science rhetoric was then amplified 
through party allies from the top down, echoed by Sean Hannity, Laura Ingram, and Rush 
Limbaugh (Cairney and Wellstead 2021). Rhetoric directed toward the public has long been a 
major avenue by which representative and technocratic figures signal their reliability, their 
capabilities, and their good intentions to constituents (e.g., Kernell 1997). And in the context of 
COVID-19, political communications with the public have become something of a collision site: 
a battle ground for politicians to air their narratives, undercut or promote experts, and try their 
hand at convincing the citizenry to trust their side of the story. This thesis aims to determine 
whether particular types of these rhetorical efforts by politicians are effective. 
 
 
2.5: Political Communication 
 
The Listener: Individual-Level Psychology 
 
In any communication, there are two sides: the speaker’s and the listener’s. Before 
examining the methods speakers (i.e., politicians and technocrats) employ in their rhetoric, it is 
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pertinent briefly to examine notable individual-level psychological factors involved on the part 
of the listener: 1) the party heuristic and 2) the consensus heuristic.  
When analyzing political speech, listeners use shortcuts called heuristics to lessen the 
burden of processing. A speaker’s party (Democrat, Republican, etc.) often acts as a powerful 
mental shortcut when listeners are making inferences about speakers’ values and issue positions. 
The party heuristic has been found to be particularly influential not only when determining the 
ideological positions of speakers, but also when listeners are deciding whether or not to accept or 
reject the content of a speaker’s message (Foos and de Rooij 2013). Thus, if listeners 
sympathize/identify with the speaker’s party affiliation, they are more likely to agree with the 
speaker’s message content; and if listeners do not sympathize/identify with the speaker’s party 
affiliation, they are more likely to disagree with the speaker’s message content.  
Consensus is another powerful cue to listeners when determining whether to accept or 
reject an argument. One of the foremost human psychological tendencies is to strive for 
accuracy—the correct perception of the world. Famously demonstrated in the classic Asch line 
experiment and supported by later studies (e.g., Darke et al. 1998), lack of controversy or 
argument on an issue encourages listeners to join the consensus (because they believe that, if 
everyone agrees, the position taken must be correct). 
 
The Speaker: Rhetorical Techniques and Trends 
We turn now to the speaker side of political communications. When forming positions 
and making arguments, politicians are notorious for employing motivated, or conclusion-driven, 
reasoning. That is, previously held beliefs and values can sway a politician’s (or citizen’s) 
narrative of evidence (Baekgaard et al. 2017). This effect is so prominent that, in the face of 
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mounting evidence deviating from a prior conviction, prior beliefs actually exert stronger 
influence over politicians’ interpretations (Baekgaard et al. 2017). The applications of this 
finding are certainly important in the context of a pandemic or any crisis, because, simply on a 
cognitive level, motivated reasoning can lead strongly opinionated politicians to come to the 
wrong conclusions and disseminate narratives that are objectively contrary to data. For example, 
a politician who prioritizes a strong economy and low levels of government interference could 
conceivably downplay the dangers of open operation illustrated by even overwhelming amounts 
of conclusive data (and the same could be true for an unequivocally pro-science politician and 
his/her tendency to overweight dangers in decision-making). 
Motivated use of data and scientific evidence is present in various ideological debates, 
such as that of gay marriage and gay parenting laws (i.e., an anti-gay parenting proponent might 
put forth a study suggesting children are psychologically harmed in the non-traditional 
household, while a pro-gay parenting proponent might point to a study that demonstrates no 
harm). In addition to championing their respective sides via scientific studies, advocates also 
attack the validity of the other side’s science. According to Clarke (2000), attacks on scientific 
evidence are conducted via three rhetorical techniques: emphasizing bias/ulterior motives; 
calling the study flawed from a methodological standpoint; and appealing to the idea of 
“common sense” as a measuring stick of how believable the science is (Clarke 2000). Despite the 
ways in which scientific evidence can be twisted on the political stage, Clarke reaffirms that it 
has a rightful place in the political process. Science is a powerful legitimizing agent, and it will 
remain as so while governance structures continue to be driven to action by prevailing scientific 
narratives (Clarke 2000). 
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 If Clarke is correct—if political use of scientific fact is here to stay—how can listeners 
ensure they are choosing the correct data-driven narrative? Put simply, how do we distinguish 
between truth and ideologically-fueled fallacy? According to Pew Research, the answer to these 
questions is proving elusive: 64% of respondents reported it was either “very hard” or 
“somewhat hard” “to tell the difference between what’s true and what’s not true when listening 




If listeners struggle to glean the truth from political communications, perhaps it falls to 
speakers to be more convincing. In fact, existing research has shown that the content of listeners’ 
preferences and judgements do fluctuate in a manner consistent with rhetoric from politicians. 
One study from Koch (1998) analyzed changes in opinion over the course of Clinton-era 
healthcare reform—an increase in favor for public provision of healthcare, for example, and a 
renewed emphasis on the importance of equality. Koch then sought correlations between these 
preference changes and the content of reform proponents and critics (as laid out in Jacobs and 
Shapiro 1998). Koch found not only that public opinion tended to move in tandem with the 
content elite rhetoric, but also that the degree of opinion change was impacted by level of 
political awareness. Those who were scored as having a “medium” level of political awareness 
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were most susceptible to opinion change, while those who were deemed “highly” politically 
aware experienced the smallest changes. Koch discusses the implications of these findings, 
suggesting that rhetorical strategies by politicians to shape public opinion (ex. “going public,” 
Kernell 1997) deserve further study (Koch 1998). 
 
Attack Rhetoric 
This thesis centers primarily on the effects of a particular type of political speech: attack 
rhetoric. There is general consensus among scholars that negative political rhetoric aimed at 
opposing parties has been on the rise (Franklin-Fowler, Ridout & Franz 2016). However, the 
effects of negativity in politics remain largely unclear. One attractive theory from Ansolabehere, 
Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino (1994) suggests negative ads in campaigns beget lower voter 
turnout and “a weakened sense of political efficacy” (Ansolabehere et al. 1994). This 
“demobilization hypothesis” has subsequently been undercut (e.g., Niven 2006), leading to a 
renewed and still-incomplete search for insight into how negativity impacts the political process 
(Geer and Geer 2003). For example, one study found that people are more likely to remember 
inaccurate items (“intrusions”) when viewing attack ads relative to when they are watching 
positive political ads (Geer and Geer 2003). The application of this finding to a COVID-19 
context is stunning. It suggests that ad hominem or issue attacks leveled toward the scientific 
community or political parties sabotages the ultimate goal of providing the public with good 
information. 
Recent doctoral-level research has addressed “conflict” or “attack” rhetoric in political 
speech aimed toward non-political entities. Specifically, Gomez (2018) examined whether verbal 
attacks leveled against opposing figures impacted citizen perceptions of and support for the 
attacker and target. Gomez found that conditions involving blame rhetoric elicited negative 
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emotions from respondents and less favorable views toward political speakers. In contrast, 
conditions lacking that rhetoric induced more positive feelings among respondents. Results of 
this survey experiment also suggested that attacks leveled against non-political actors (in this 
case, universities in student-loan forgiveness policy debates) “can be effective at manipulating 
perceptions of the attacked group” (Gomez v-vi). Gomez’s findings also allude to a connection 
between increasing political attack rhetoric and faith in the existing governance system (i.e., 
correlating declines in American pro-democratic sentiment as documented in Foa and Mounk 
2017). 
Apart from Gomez’s work, however, the effects of attack rhetoric aimed at non-political 
third parties are woefully understudied. Through factorial and conjoint experiments described in 
the following section, this thesis aims to better understand how listeners respond to rhetoric that 
undercuts experts in a crisis setting.  
 28 
Chapter 3: Survey Experiment Methodology 
 
 
3.1: Survey Experiment Description 
 
This survey experiment consists of two parts, the first of which leverages a factorial 
design and the second of which leverages a conjoint design. On the methodological side of 
existing literature, conjoint designs are described as uniquely positioned to examine trust and 
political communication. Analysis of the effects of political communication upon listeners is, by 
nature, “a study of multidimensional causal relations” (Knudsen and Johannesson 2019: 260). 
Via traditional survey experiments, each dimension must be isolated and tested individually. This 
experimental truth exemplifies “the curse of dimensionality” (Ho et al., 2007). However, via a 
conjoint survey experiment, causal dimensions can be tested simultaneously and efficiently: 
“…[T]raditional conjoint designs can improve causal inference in research where one is 
interested in how a range of different characteristics of a phenomenon affects people’s probability 
of trusting, selecting, or using another phenomenon (for instance, how politicians’ characteristics 
[such as the way they communicate] shape people’s trust in politicians) in a study that randomly 
varies certain communication styles or rhetorical techniques between two hypothetical politicians 
and asks respondents to compare and contrast them in terms of who they trust. Future research 
should seek to use conjoint experiments in such instances” (Knudsen and Johannesson 2019: 
269). 
 
3.2: Platforms: Conjoint.ly and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
 
The survey was constructed on the software platform Conjoint.ly. This tool offers free 
academic licenses to institutional users, and it provides choice-based conjoint (discrete choice) 
capabilities in addition to standard survey functionality. Part I of my survey employed the latter, 
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and Part II employed the former. Conjoint.ly technology has been used in numerous publications 
across the subject areas such as medicine (e.g., Ross & Vidovich, 2018; Golda et al., 2019), 
education (e.g., Dobrota et al., 2018), and marketing (e.g., Marcos 2020). 
The link to the Conjoint.ly survey experiment was advertised on Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk), a crowdsourcing platform launched in 2005. Via this platform, researchers 
(requesters) can purchase the time of a pool of participants (workers). Workers browse posted 
Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) and opt to participate in return for a reward. Upon completion 
of a task, researchers can accept (or, in the event of a low-quality response, reject) respondents’ 
payment requests. 
One concern with successful use of the MTurk platform is threats to external validity. To 
better understand the makeup of MTurk samples, social science researchers have conducted 
analyses on the MTurk worker population to determine whether it is representative of the broader 
US population. Women dominate the platform on the dimension of gender, comprising over 60% 
of US respondents. MTurkers tend to have a higher level of education than the average 
American, with over 30% of them holding a Bachelor’s degree (Ipeirotis 2010). Workers are 
disproportionately white (over 80%, according to a 2010 report); and the population skews 
toward younger age groups, with a mean age of 32 (Berinsky et al. 2012). Over 40% of the 
participant pool identifies with the Democratic party, while only around 17% identifies with the 
Republican party (Berinsky et al. 2012). Generally, US MTurk workers use the platform as a 
vein of secondary income. Workers’ annual income is skewed toward lower levels, with around 
two-thirds of the platform’s respondents making less than $60,000 per year (Ipeirotis 2010). Still, 
even with these biases, Berinsky et al. (2012) concludes that MTurk population characteristics 
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are “more representative and diverse than the corresponding student and convenience samples 
typically used in experimental political science studies” (Berinsky et al. 2012: 352). 
Another concern with successful use of the MTurk platform is threats to internal validity. 
These threats are largely derived from concerns that 1) participants contaminate results by 
retaking surveys across multiple accounts; and 2) survey-takers are inattentive. Regarding the 
former concern, Berinsky et al. (2012) found that 2.4% of their study’s total responses originated 
from the same IP address. They conclude that such overlap can be explained by workers taking 
surveys in communal areas (ex. office buildings, coffee shops) and does not necessitate repeat 
survey-takers. In the event that the 2.4% is reflective of repeat respondents, the percentage is 
small and threat of overall data contamination is minimal (Berinsky et al. 2012). Regarding the 
latter concern of inattentive participants, Berinsky et al. (2012) found that MTurk respondents 
correctly answered a comprehension check at a higher rate than respondents on another reputable 
online panel (Polimetrix/YouGov) (60% pass rate vs. 49% pass rate). Attention check 
performance superior to traditional subject pools (i.e., college students/convenience samples) 
was similarly observed by Hauser and Schwarz (2015).  
Despite these promising results that champion MTurk as a low-cost, high-quality forum, 
the literature on MTurk data quality remains mixed. Chmielewski and Kucker (2020) cite the 
overwhelming emergence of bots and farmers, and found MTurk failure rates for validity checks 
as high as 62% in one Wave of their study. Meanwhile, Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 
(2009) identified a poorer pass rate on instructional manipulation checks than was found in a 
college participant pool. 
Still, incentives for solid participant attention are certainly structured into MTurk 
functionality. Specifically, when a requester exercises his or her ability to deny a worker 
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payment for low-quality results, workers’ future earnings prospects on MTurk are tangibly 
impacted. Requesters can bar workers from their surveys if they fail to clear a specified historical 
approval rate across their working lifetime (i.e., if a respondent’s work has been “accepted” on 
95% of his or her previous tasks, that respondent will have more survey-taking—and money-
making—opportunities) (Berinsky et al. 2012). 
 
3.3: Part I—Factorial Design 
 
Part I of the survey leverages a 23 factorial design to determine whether attack rhetoric 
impacts participants’ perceptions of the competence, beneficence, and trustworthiness of both 
scientific and political speakers. The dimensions of competence and beneficence were selected 
based on Bennett’s framework of conditions for recommendation trust discussed in the literature 
review, and trustworthiness was selected as a main outcome measurement. 
In this study, participants were exposed to a modified excerpt from a news article 
outlining the scientific reasoning behind the need to wear a mask even after vaccination. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of eight conditions, each of which consisted of a 
short statement by a hypothetical politician who responded to the earlier scientific reasoning 
stimulus.  
Politician statements varied along three dimensions (factors). The three factors (with two 
levels each) of the political stimuli are: 1) factual consensus; 2) speaker party; and 3) ad 
hominem praise/attack behavior. For example, Condition 1 involves a Republican Senator 
agreeing with the scientific stimulus’s recommendation and reasoning, and praising the 
scientists advocating for them. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Condition 7 involves a 
Democratic Senator disagreeing with the scientific stimulus’s recommendation and reasoning, 
and attacking the scientists advocating for them. 
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Condition 1: Republican/Agree/Praise 
Condition 2: Republican/Agree/Attack 
Condition 3: Democrat/Agree/Praise 
Condition 4: Democrat/Agree/Attack 
Condition 5: Republican/Disagree/Praise 
Condition 6: Republican/Disagree/Attack 
Condition 7: Democrat/Disagree/Praise 
Condition 8: Democrat/Disagree/Attack 
 
Following exposure to their respective condition, participants were then asked to express 
their attitudes, on a Likert scale of “1 - Strongly Disagree” to “5 - Strongly Agree,” regarding a 
set of statements referring to the speakers in the scientific and political stimuli. The statements 
assess participants’ perceptions of politician and scientist competence (ex., “Senator Smith is 
good at his job.”), reliability (“Dr. Trevor is trustworthy.”), and beneficence (“Dr. Trevor is 
looking out for the public’s best interest.”). Additional follow-up questions address effects of the 
content of the stimuli (ex., “It is important for people to wear a mask even after vaccination.”). 
Fourteen of these post-stimulus statements were presented to participants, and an attention check 
was imbedded in the fourteen-question set. 
Regarding data analysis, the mean outputs from the Likert scale follow-up questions will 
subsequently be compared among conditions to gain insight into how party, political and 
scientific consensus, and ad hominem attack rhetoric affects participant opinions. For example, 
in assessing the main effect of ad hominem attacks, the averaged mean responses of respondents 
in “praise” conditions (1, 3, 5, and 7) will be compared to the averaged mean responses of 
respondents in “attack” conditions (2, 4, 6, and 8). As follows, when analyzing the main effect of 
“speaker party,” mean Likert responses by participants in conditions with Republican speakers 
(1, 2, 5, and 6) will be compared to mean Likert responses by respondents in conditions with 
Democratic speakers (3, 4, 7, and 8). And finally, when evaluating the main effect of consensus 
 33 
(or lack thereof), mean responses from “agree” conditions (1, 2, 3, and 4) will be compared to 
mean responses from “disagree” conditions (5, 6, 7, and 8). 
 
Consensus Attack/Praise Party 
Agree Disagree Attack Praise Republican Democrat 
Condition 1 Condition 5 Condition 2 Condition 1 Condition 1 Condition 3 
Condition 2 Condition 6 Condition 4 Condition 3 Condition 2 Condition 4 
Condition 3 Condition 7 Condition 6 Condition 5 Condition 5 Condition 7 
Condition 4 Condition 8 Condition 8 Condition 7 Condition 6 Condition 8 
 
Condition matchups for factorial data analysis. 
 
Prior to data collection, I hypothesized that: 
 
(1) Ad hominem attack rhetoric will negatively impact participant perception of scientists and 
politicians, leading to less favorable (lower) mean responses to follow-up Likert scale questions 
compared to the mean responses of “praise” condition responses, 
 
(2) Via the consensus heuristic, conditions involving agreement between politician and scientist will 
yield more favorable (higher) mean responses to follow-up Likert scale questions compared to 




(3) Conditions involving Republican speakers and Democratic speakers will beget comparable mean 
responses to follow-up Likert scale questions. 
 
 
3.4: Part II—Conjoint Design 
 
 Part 2 of this survey leverages a vignette design, a choice-based conjoint (CBC) variant, 
to determine the elements of public health messaging that participants find most compelling 
when deciding whether or not to abide by a recommendation. 
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 Conjoint designs allow researchers to better understand how people choose between 
options that simultaneously differ with respect to various qualities. The ability of the conjoint to 
shed light on respondent priorities and tradeoffs in decision-making has lent itself well to 
applications in marketing/business research (Green & Srinivasan 1990) and the social sciences, 
including many topics in political science. Those topics span from the likes of climate policy-
making (e.g., Gampfer et al. 2014) to voter preferences in political races (e.g., Bansak et al. 
2019). Vignette experiments maintain the conjoint spirit, but differ in that they present choice 
options to respondents in text rather than tabular format. One potential limitation here is that, 
because order affects coherence in text, it is harder to randomize the sequence in which attributes 
are presented in vignette experiments than in traditional tabular conjoint experiments (Bansak et 
al., 2019).  
In a 2014 analysis of vignette and conjoint survey experiment external validity, 
Hainmueller et al. (2014) found that both tools perform fairly well in their task of describing 
real-world drivers of choice. However, the analysis yielded important findings to guide future 
designs. Notably, paired experiments—i.e., those designs that presented more than one choice 
option to participants—generally performed better than single-profile experiments. Overall, in 
order to maximize real-world applicability, Hainmueller emphasized the importance of designs 
that incentivize participants to engage critically with the options and minimize satisficing 
tendencies (Hainmeuller et al. 2014). To these ends, my experiment presented three speaker 
profiles per choice to respondents; and employed a forced-stay function to encourage participants 
to read options fully. 
Participants were first presented with one of four recommendations (ex. “Avoid gathering 
in groups with family around the holidays.”). Then participants were presented with a set of three 
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speaker profiles that varied along three attributes. The speakers varied with respect to source 
(Democratic politician, Republican politician, scientist), evidentiary support (hard data, 
theoretical justifications), and attitude toward scientists (for, neutral, against). Respondents were 
subsequently forced to choose which speaker they would be “most willing to listen to” when 
deciding whether or not to follow the recommendation. 
 Recommendation conditions: 
1) Personal Condition: “Avoid gathering in groups with family around the holidays.” 
2) General Condition: “Wear a mask when in public.” 
3) General Condition: “Receive the COVID-19 vaccine.” 
4) Economic Condition: “Businesses should spend money on spread-limiting measures 
(ex. plexiglass barriers) and should reduce capacity.” 
 
Attribute 1: Source 
 Levels:  
1) Scientist 
2) Democratic Senator 
3) Republican Senator 
 
Attribute 2: Justification 
Levels:  
1) Hard data from scientific studies 
2) “Appeals to ideals” justifications (ex. “soft” justifications having to do with no-harm 
oaths taken by scientists or representative responsibilities for elected officials). 
 
Attribute 3: Attitude toward science 
 Levels: 
1) Pro-scientist: Scientists should lead public health policy-making 
2) Neutral/Middle-ground: Scientists should probably be part of the conversation in 
public health policy-making 
3) Anti-scientist: Scientists belong in the lab, not politics 
 
The four recommendation conditions varied with respect to level of personal cost 
involved (e.g., not seeing family around the holidays is conceivably more personally restricting 
and emotionally taxing than donning a mask when in public). The intention behind varying 
recommendations was to provide insight into whether participants prefer to receive certain types 
of recommendations from certain sources (e.g., perhaps people feel more comfortable receiving 
recommendations that impact their families from their elected representatives than from a 
scientific technocrat wholly unknown to them). 
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 Three restrictions were manually placed on the speaker profiles to avoid nonsensical level 
groupings that would confuse respondents. Political speakers (Democratic and Republican 
Senators) were prohibited from pairing with the “do no harm” justification, while the scientific 
speaker was prohibited from pairing with the “elected to represent the best interest” justification. 
Though restrictions of any kind muddy the pure randomization of the vignette experiment, 
pairing of non-matching justifications and sources would likely perplex participants and fail to 
yield meaningful data. Therefore, restrictions were deemed necessary and were used sparingly 
(Hainmueller et al. 2013; Bansak et al. 2019). Also, because profiles were presented in sentence-
form (vignettes), order of attributes was held constant by necessity to preserve coherence 
(Bansak et al. 2019). 
Prior to data collection, I hypothesized that: 
 
(1) Participants in personal and economic recommendation conditions will place higher value on 
political sources (presumably because they elected them to look out for these interests), and 
higher value on scientific sources for general recommendations. 
 
(2) Scientific/hard evidence justifications will be preferable to non-scientific/ideals-based 
justifications. 
 
(3) Via the party heuristic, participants will favor speakers who belong to the parties with which they 
identify. 
 
(4) A positive attitude toward science will be the highest-valued attribute for participants as they 
decide whether or not to follow their given recommendation. 
 
 
3.5: Demographic and Baseline Questions 
  
 At the beginning of the survey, standard demographic questions were posed to 
participants. They collected data on age, gender, ethnicity, education level, partisan affiliation, 
and ideological affiliation. At the end of the survey, participants were asked a series of baseline 
questions that assessed their familiarity with the stimulus content (ex. “How familiar are you 
with official CDC/WHO guidelines for the use of masks after vaccination?”), as well as pre-
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existing mental and behavioral states (ex. “How frequently do you wear a mask in public?” and 
“What are your thoughts on climate change?”). 
 
3.6: Data Output and Analysis 
 
Sample size was determined using Qualtrics’ free online sample size calculator. Relative 
metrics used in the calculation were a generalizable population of 328 million (US population), a 
5% significance level, a 4% margin of error, and a response distribution of 50%. Based on these 
metrics, the target sample size for this survey was a minimum of 601 participants. 
The factorial component of the survey returned mean responses and response distribution 
for each Likert scale question. Conjoint.ly allows for segmentation of data, a tool that enables the 
responses from each condition to be viewed separately from the responses of other conditions. 
The aggregate/non-segmented output from Question 19 in the soft launch (N=20) is pictured 





Figure 4: Aggregate results, example of factorial data output on a single Likert scale question. N=20. 
 
 
The vignette/CBC portion of the survey experiment returns relative importance and value 
percentages for each attribute and attribute level. Again, data viewing can be segmented to show 
only responses from particular conditions. 
At a basic level, CBC data on Conjoint.ly is returned in the form of part-worth utilities, a 
type of interval data. Interval data is characterized by units whose incremental values are equal 
(i.e., a 10-point difference between a 10% part-worth and 20% part-worth represents the same 
value as the 10-point difference between a 20% part-worth and a 30% part-worth). However, an 
attribute with a 20% part-worth cannot be said to be twice as important as an attribute with a 
10% part-worth. Also characteristic of interval data, part-worth utilities are scaled around an 
arbitrary origin (Orme 2002). 
The CBC data output on Conjoint.ly returns two major buckets of results, the first of 
which is the “relative value by level” (i.e., for the “source” attribute, levels would be “scientist,” 
“Democratic Senator,” and “Republican Senator”) (Figure 5). Part-worth data is displayed 
across a negative and positive x-axis. Due to the scaled nature of part-worth utilities, their sum 
within each attribute (i.e., the sum of the three levels within “Justification”) is equal to zero. 
Therefore, negative (or lower) part-worth utilities do not indicate that levels were unpopular, in 
an absolute sense. However, in a relative sense, they do indicate that other levels were more 
popular (Orme 2002). Thus, the type of claim we can make from “relative value by level” part-
worth outputs is as follows: 
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I. Within each attribute, we can evaluate which levels were most popular relative 
to others, and size of increases/decreases in preference between levels. For 
example, in the soft-launch data below, the scientific speaker was the most-preferred 
relative to the political speakers. The increase in preference for a scientist (level part-
worth: 27.65%) over a Democratic Senator (level part-worth: -8.23%) is 35.88%, 
more than three times the 11.19% increase in preference for a Democratic Senator 
over a Republican Senator (level part-worth: -19.42%). 
 
 
Figure 5: Aggregate relative values by attribute level results from CBC: Example of conjoint part-worth 
utility data from soft launch.  
 
Source: (Sen., D = -8.23%), (Sen, R = -19.42%), (Scientist = 27.65%); Justification: (Hard data 
= 1.58%), (“Look out for constituents” = 5.01%), (“Do no harm” = -6.59%); Attitude toward science: 
(Lead = 8.76%), (Part of the conversation = 16.29%), (Belong in the lab = -25.05%). 
 
The second cache of results Conjoint.ly returns is aggregated from “levels” data and is 
termed “relative importance by attributes” (i.e., source, justification, and attitude toward science) 
(Figure 6). These outputs describe the range of level values within each attribute and represent 
those ranges as percentages. For example, in the soft-launch data below, the relative importance 
percentage for the “source” attribute is 47%, which is obtained by subtracting the lowest level 
value in the attribute (Republican Senator, -19.42%) from the highest level value in the attribute 
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(scientist, 27.65%). Thus, in comparing level ranges across attributes, relative importance is 
determined by accounting for how much of a change in preference each attribute could 
conceivably lead to. Importance outputs are strongly affected by extreme levels—for instance, if 
one attribute level presented to respondents is immensely undesirable, the range of that attribute 
will be broadened and the relative importance of the attribute will increase, as it has the potential 
to capture a larger change in preference. In conjunction, the relative importance of other 
attributes will decrease, because relative importance percentages of all attributes sum to 100%. It 
is important to note that, unlike the part-worth utilities from which they are derived, importance 
outputs are ratio data (Orme 2002). Therefore, the type of claim we can make about “relative 
importance by attribute” data is as follows:  
I. One attribute is more important to respondents (i.e., captures more 
preference variation) than another. For example, in the soft-launch data below, 
the Source attribute has a relative importance of 47%, while the Justification 
attribute has a relative importance of 12%. According to these data, respondents 




Figure 6: Aggregate relative importance by attribute results from CBC, example of conjoint data output.  
 




3.7: Quality Assurance 
 
In order to make use of MTurk’s accept/reject mechanism appropriately, this survey 
employed various techniques to separate the low-quality from the high-quality responses: 
comprehension or “factual manipulation” checks, warnings, attention checks, and forced-time 
delays. 
Per Hauser, Paolacci, and Chandler (2018), comprehension checks are preferable to 
attention checks when employing quality assurance methods because they “measure directly 
what attention checks try to measure indirectly—whether the participant was aware of the 
information that is necessary to produce the phenomena of interest” (Hauser, Paolacci, and 
Chandler 2018: 6). Two questions acting as comprehension checks appear early on in the survey 
in Part I. They follow the scientific stimulus; and if participants fail either check, they are 
immediately removed from the survey environment and excluded from data collection. Those 
comprehension checks are immediately preceded by explicit warnings to participants notifying 
them that, if they answer incorrectly, they will be ineligible for compensation (Huang et al. 
2012). 
The second quality assurance technique this survey employs is an attention check. The 
attention check appears in Part I of the survey and is embedded in the Likert scale questions. The 
question asks participants to select “Strongly Agree” if they are paying attention. Again, 
participants who fail this attention check will be excluded from data analysis. More informally, 
Part II of the survey intersperses reminders of the participants’ respective recommendation 
conditions among conjoint questions. The purpose of these reminders is to 1) ensure that 
participants recall the recommendation their speakers are addressing; and 2) allow respondents 
small breaks between questions to avoid monotony and subsequent attention drift. 
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The final quality assurance technique built into this survey is forced stay-time for stimuli 
and conjoint questions. Forcing participants to remain on pages for a set amount of time (ex., 
around 8 seconds for conjoint questions) reduces the likelihood that they will click through the 
questions without content consideration (Hauser, Paolacci, and Chandler 2018). 
 
3.8: Ethical Considerations 
 
The topic of this survey is highly salient and could be considered, in some respects, to 
veer into the controversial. As noted in the Introduction, misinformation about the COVID-19 
pandemic and anti-science sentiment is rampant. In September 2020, 49% of US adults reported 
they would Probably or Definitely not get a COVID-19 vaccine. Though this number has 
declined to 30% as of February 2021, pains were taken from a methodological standpoint to 
ensure that no participant would come away from this survey less willing to engage with 
scientific facts or public health recommendations (Pew 2021). 
To this end, a consent document at the beginning of the survey and a debrief document at 
its conclusion both inform participants that statements made by “scientists” and various 
“Senators” in the stimuli are purely hypothetical. The debrief document contains links to the 
Coronavirus information pages of both the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the 
World Health Organization. 
Another ethical component of planning this study centered around the MTurk Platform. 
MTurk workers receive a median wage of $2 per hour, with 96% of workers earning below the 
federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour (Hara et al. 2018). When choosing how to price my 
rewards, I aimed to price at a rate between $6.60 per hour and $9.90 per hour (i.e., $1.65 for 10 
to 15 minutes of work).  
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
4.1: Sample Characteristics 
 
The survey was taken by 602 participants (N = 602). Contrary to MTurk’s holistic gender 
bias toward women, men were slightly overrepresented in this sample (57% men vs. 42% 
women). In keeping with other general MTurk population trends, the average age of participants 
was 36 years. Respondents were overwhelmingly white (56%) and Asian (26%), and skewed 
toward higher education levels (73% of respondents reported receiving a Bachelor’s degree or 
higher). Democrats were overrepresented in the sample (47% Democrats vs. 31% Republicans), 
and slightly more than one in five participants identified as “Independent/Other.” Among those 
who identified as Independents/Other, leaning tendencies toward either the Republican or 
Democratic party were fairly evenly distributed.  
Regarding baseline behavior, knowledge, and beliefs, the sample was heavily biased 
toward individuals who exhibited scientifically-aware and scientifically-sympathetic tendencies. 
On a Likert scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 = Not at all familiar and 5 = Very familiar), nearly 80% of 
respondents marked the two top boxes (4 or 5) when describing their familiarity with CDC/WHO 
guidelines for mask use after vaccination; and when describing their familiarity with the state of 
COVID-19-related scientific research. The respondent sample was slightly more likely to wear 
masks than the broader public (HealthDay News 2020) and had strong belief in the reality of 
climate change. The Appendix includes a full breakdown of the sample’s demographic 
characteristics. 
 
4.2: Part I—Factorial Survey Experiment 
 
Hypotheses from the factorial part of the survey experiment were as follows: 
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(1) Ad hominem attack rhetoric will negatively impact participant perception of scientists and 
politicians, leading to less favorable (lower) mean responses to follow-up Likert scale questions 
compared to the mean responses of “praise” condition responses, 
 
(2) Via the consensus heuristic, conditions involving agreement between politician and scientist will 
yield more favorable (higher) mean responses to follow-up Likert scale questions compared to 




(3) Conditions involving Republican speakers and Democratic speakers will beget comparable mean 
responses to follow-up Likert scale questions. 
 
To determine support (or lack thereof) for Hypothesis (1), mean responses of the four 
praise conditions were compared to mean responses of the four attack conditions. Paired two-tail 
t-tests were then performed to determine whether differences in means were statistically 
significant. 
 Responses between attack and praise conditions (Table 1) on Likert scale questions 
having to do with Dr. Trevor’s competence, good intent, and overall trustworthiness were, for the 
most part, unchanged. That is, for all statements excepting one, attack rhetoric had no negative 
effect on participant perceptions of the scientist. The sole exception was participant responses to 
“Dr. Trevor is foolish.” On a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree), 
average agreement with the “foolish” statement increased around 0.24 points between the praise 
conditions and the attack conditions. The increase was statistically significant, with p-value < 
0.01. The portion of Hypothesis (1) regarding negative effects of attack rhetoric on perception of 
the scientist is thus largely unsupported. 
 However, the part of Hypothesis (1) relating to increased negative perception of the 
attacker—the politician—finds a foothold in the data. The most notable shifts—with p-values 
below 0.001—in responses between conditions pertained to participants’ perception of Senator 
Smith. Respondents in attack conditions rated the Senator consistently lower than those in the 
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praise conditions on dimensions of competence, good intention, and trustworthiness. Declines in 
favorable perception of the Senator for the three questions in Table 1 hovered around 0.8 points, 
more than three times the size of declines seen in Dr. Trevor’s competency rating (i.e., for the 
“foolish” statement). Out of the three factors tested in this experiment, attack rhetoric led to the 
largest average declines in ratings for the Senator.  
 Similar partial hypothesis fulfillment is gleaned from data regarding the effects of 
consensus on perceptions of politicians and scientists (Table 2) Respondents rated the Senator 
lower on all dimensions when he disagreed with scientific recommendations, with p-values < 
0.001. This finding partially confirms Hypothesis (2). Meanwhile, changes in ratings of the 
scientist were small in absolute terms (<0.1) and statistically insignificant. This finding runs 
contrary to part of Hypothesis (2). 
 Data from party conditions are consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis (3). No 
statistically significant mean differences were present when the hypothetical Senator was a 
Republican vs. a Democrat (Table 3). 
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4.3: Part II—Conjoint Survey Experiment 
 
 Hypotheses for the conjoint part of the survey experiment were as follows: 
 
(1) Participants in personal and economic recommendation conditions will place higher value on 
political sources (presumably because they elected them to look out for these interests), and 
higher value on scientific sources for general recommendations. 
 
(2) Scientific/hard evidence justifications will be preferable to non-scientific/ideals-based 
justifications. 
 
(3) Via the party heuristic, participants will favor speakers who belong to the parties with which they 
identify. 
 
(4) A positive attitude toward science will be the highest-valued attribute for participants as they 
decide whether or not to follow their given recommendation. 
 
In order to examine these hypotheses, results from part II of the survey experiment, the 
conjoint design, were analyzed 1) on aggregate (all participants included; Figures 7 & 8); 2) 
segmented by recommendation condition; and 3) segmented by respondent party. 
 
All responses (aggregate) 
 
Figure 7: Relative importance by attribute, all responses. Source: 38% (95% CI = 36% to 




Aggregate data from Figure 7 suggests that, in keeping with Hypothesis (4), attitude 
toward science did, indeed, end up being “most important” (i.e., accounting for the greatest shifts 
in choices). At 38%, respondents deemed source the second-most important attribute, notable 
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because the finding goes against what the party heuristic would predict (i.e., that source is the be-
all, end-all). Intriguingly, justification (speakers’ citation of “hard data” vs. ideals) did not seem 
as important to respondents when choosing speakers. 
When data is broken down to attribute level view (Figure 8), it suggests that respondents 
found neutral/pro-science attitudes significantly more attractive than “anti-science”/“science 
belongs in the lab” rhetoric. Overall, respondents greatly preferred scientific speakers to political 
ones. Democratic politicians were moderately preferable to Republican politicians as speakers. 
However, it is important to note that participant sample was weighted toward those who identify 
as Democrats (47% Democrat vs. 31% Republican). Hard data justifications were slightly more 
popular than softer ideals, but justification/evidence in general was not as polarizing for 
respondents as the other attributes were. Thus, only weak evidence is found in favor of 
Hypothesis (2). 
When responses are broken down by recommendation condition (Figures 9, 10, 11 & 
12), data suggests no significant difference regarding relative importance of attributes among 
varied recommendations. Thus, little to no evidence in favor of Hypothesis (1) is found.  
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All responses (aggregate) 
 
 
Figure 8: Relative value by attribute level, all responses. Source: Senator, D = -5.25%, Senator, 
R = -16.41%, Scientist = 21.67%; Justification: Hard data = 4.9%, “Look out for constituents” 
= -0.29%, “Do no harm” = -4.6%; Attitude toward science: Scientists should lead = 13.56%, 
“Part of the conversation” = 19.43%, “Belong in the lab” = -32.99%. 
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Recommendation condition segmentation 
 
1. Figure 9: Family gathering recommendation: 
  
 
2. Figure 10: Mask-wearing recommendation 
 
3. Figure 11: Vaccine recommendation 
 








Figure 13: Democrats, relative value by attribute level. 
 
Figure 14: Republicans, relative value by attribute level 
 
 
When data is segmented along party lines (Figures 13 & 14), Republicans exhibited 
stronger preferences for scientists over speakers from their own party than did Democrats. 
Consistent with the party heuristic and Hypothesis (3), Democrats gravitated more toward non-
Republican speakers, and Republicans gravitated more toward non-Democratic speakers. 
However, findings also suggest that both self-identified Democrats and Republicans exhibit 
strong preferences for scientific speakers over political speakers of either party. Republicans also 
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exhibited a stronger preference for the neutral option of the “Attitude toward science” attribute, 
whereas Democrats did not exhibit a statistically significant preference between the neutral 
option and the “scientists should lead” option. Regardless, both parties strongly favored either 
neutral or pro-science attitudes over the anti-science “science belongs in the lab” position. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
5.1: Main Findings 
By way of a two-part survey experiment, this thesis set out to examine the questions: 
Does political rhetoric attacking scientists and their recommendations truly affect public 
perceptions of competence, beneficence, and trustworthiness? And does that rhetoric indeed 
reduce compliance with recommendations? The major hypotheses at the outset of this 
exploration were as follows: 
 
1) Rhetoric that attacks and/or undercuts scientific sources will negatively impact public 
perception of both scientists—the “attacked”—and politicians—the “attackers”—on 
dimensions of competence, beneficence, and trustworthiness. 
 
2) When receiving public health messaging, attitude expressed toward science is 
consequential—i.e., it matters—to listeners. 
 
 
Hypothesis (1) and Factorial Results 
 
The results from Part I of the survey both support and diverge from different parts of 
Hypothesis (1). As described in the previous section, attack rhetoric did not, on aggregate, affect 
participant perceptions of competence, beneficence/good intent, or trustworthiness with respect 
to scientist Dr. Trevor. This runs contrary to Gomez’s (2018) findings that detail how attacked, 
non-political third parties are perceived more negatively than those that are praised by 
politicians. Particularly in light of divergent results and the rising prominence of this type of 
political speech (Franklin-Fowler, Ridout & Franz 2016), I would second Gomez’s urging for 
further research on the effects of conflict rhetoric on public perception. 
The single exception to the finding above—that perception of scientists is largely 
unaffected by attack rhetoric—was a statistically significant increase in respondents’ sense that 
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Dr. Trevor was “foolish.” That being said, though the shift was significant, it was very small in 
absolute terms. The shift could be attributed to a priming effect rather than an actual change in 
sentiment toward the scientist—i.e., respondents saw the word “foolish” in the political stimulus 
and it felt more accessible or relevant when rating their attitudes on a Likert scale. But even if 
this is the case, the ability of name-calling to prime mimicry in listeners, even marginally, is 
perhaps concerning in some ways. As noted by Bennett (2020), even small seeds of doubt in 
experts can beget delays in action and compliance. Those delays can be costly: as Dr. Deborah 
Birx recently put it in a CNN documentary, hundreds of thousands of COVID-19 infections and 
fatalities “could have been mitigated or decreased substantially” if governmental messaging had 
been more consistent and spread-prevention measures had been adopted sooner (Sager 2021). 
Overall, however, the results of the factorial experiment paint a bright picture for trust in 
science. In keeping with public opinion trends discussed earlier, respondents not only exhibited 
more trust for the fictional scientist than for the fictional politician (as expressed by consistently 
higher mean Likert scale ratings), but they also rated the scientist as generally more competent 
and well-intentioned. The real losers here, so to speak, are the politicians. Attack rhetoric 
directed toward scientists backfired, hurting the favorability of the attacker significantly more 
than that of the attacked party. As seen through the Consensus conditions (Agree vs. Disagree), 
simply contradicting or undercutting the scientific stimulus led to lower ratings for the politician. 
No politician, regardless of party, seems to have leeway—the attacking and undercutting rhetoric 
harmed perceptions of both Democratic and Republican speakers. Ultimately, the increase in 
negative participant ratings of the “attacker” observed in the factorial experiment falls in line 
with part of Hypothesis (1). 
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Though it is pleasing that trust in scientists appears to stand robust even in the face of 
direct attacks, it is simultaneously concerning that politicians experience consistently lower 
ratings and steeper, precipitous losses. As we learn from Bertsou and Caramini (2020), 
technocrats rarely find themselves functioning in a vacuum—as Syrett’s (2003) exploration of 
healthcare in the UK found, “the inherently political nature of priority-setting…precludes any 
easy technocratic solution” (Syrett 2003: 715). It is generally the case that politicians, more so 
than scientists, are the ones communicating with the public; and it does not bode well for 
problem-solving in a crisis if the public harbors low-competence, low-beneficence, and low-trust 
evaluations of the people delivering vital information. One obvious solution to this predicament 
is to put scientists behind the podium, in front of the public—Dr. Fauci and Dr. Birx spoke at 
numerous COVID-19 briefings, and President Trump was pressured by his own party to “make 
Fauci the face of the task force” instead of Vice President Mike Pence (Cairney and Wellstead 
2021: 7). Despite these efforts, politicians continued to be the primary mouthpieces when 
disseminating public health information; and as long as that remains the case, lack of trust in 
elected representatives remains concerning. 
One potential issue with this data is its external validity—its applicability to the broader 
population. As noted in the Results section, the MTurk sample skewed Democratic and educated, 
and respondents exhibited high levels of scientific awareness (i.e., most participants already 
followed public health measures and were knowledgeable about the state of COVID-19-related 
scientific research). Embedded within the educated, pro-science aggregate, it is possible that 
there are subpopulations that could be more susceptible to the effects of attack rhetoric. At this 
stage in the pandemic, it would be nearly impossible to find a sample that is scientifically 
unaware of and non-compliant with, for example, mask-wearing recommendations—most recent 
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reports indicate that over 90% of Americans are wearing masks consistently (HealthDay News 
2020), and around 95% of sample respondents indicated they always (5) or almost always (4) 
wear a mask in public.  
 
Subgroup Analysis: Are some more susceptible to attack rhetoric than others? 
Given these external validity concerns, it may be relevant to examine mean score 
differences between Attack and Praise conditions counting the responses only of those in 
underrepresented or potentially-susceptible subgroups (i.e., those with lower education levels; 
those with lower scientific awareness; and those who are Independents/leaners). By comparing 
mean differences within subgroups to the aggregate mean differences, we can determine whether 
attack rhetoric sways certain groups more powerfully. 
Table 4 presents means of respondents reporting education levels at or below vocational 
training in Attack vs. Praise conditions, and compares mean differences for lower-education 
respondents to aggregate mean differences. The most salient finding regarding this subgroup is 
that attack and praise rhetoric was more influential for the lower-education subgroup regarding 
belief in the content of Dr. Trevor’s message—the lower-education subgroup’s mean difference 
between conditions for “Masks after vaccination are important” is nearly three times higher than 
that of the aggregate (0.16 lower-ed vs. 0.06 aggregate). 
Table 5 presents means of respondents reporting lower scientific awareness (including 
responses 1, 2, or 3 on a scale of 1 = not at all familiar with the state of COVID-19-related 
scientific research to 5 = very familiar with the state of COVID-19-related scientific research) in 
Attack vs. Praise conditions. As with Table 4, mean differences for individuals with lower 
scientific awareness are compared to aggregate mean differences. Mean differences between 
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conditions for those who were less scientifically literate were smaller than aggregate differences 
across the board. One oddity in this analysis is that, for the low-awareness subgroup, the mean 
was higher in the attack condition than in the praise condition for the statement: “It is important 
to wear a mask even after vaccination.” Thus, exposure to attack rhetoric seems to have led low-
awareness participants counterintuitively to increase their subscription to Dr. Trevor’s message 
content. Regardless of the direction of the effect (positive or negative), the magnitude of the 
mean difference for low-awareness participants is nearly three times that of the aggregate (-0.15 
low-awareness vs. 0.06 aggregate). 
Table 6 presents means of respondents identifying their Party affiliation as 
“Independent/Other” and compares mean differences for this subgroup with aggregate mean 
differences. Mean differences between Praise and Attack conditions for Independents tended to 
be similar to those for the aggregate data with respect to Senator Smith. However, relatively 
strong differences emerge regarding Independents’ attitudes toward Dr. Trevor (on dimensions 
of competence, beneficence, and trustworthiness) and his message to wear a mask even after 
vaccination. For example, the aggregate mean difference between Praise and Attack conditions 
for the competence statement “Dr. Trevor is trustworthy” is around 0.1. Meanwhile, the 
Independents’ corresponding mean difference is nearly triple the aggregate value (~0.28). 
Additionally, the Independents’ mean difference between Attack and Praise conditions for the 
“importance of wearing a mask after vaccination” is more than four times greater than that of the 
aggregate (0.26 Independents vs. 0.06 aggregate). The increase in mean difference for 
Independents relative to the aggregate dataset (regarding perceptions of Dr. Travis and his 
messaging) suggests that Independents might indeed be more easily swayed than the overall 
population by attack and praise rhetoric.  
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Table 4: Lower education 













































































































Hypothesis (2) and Conjoint Results 
 
 Results from Part II of the survey—the conjoint experiment—are similarly encouraging 
with respect to public perception of science. Respondents across the political spectrum prefer to 
get their information from scientists over their own elected representatives when it comes to 
public health messaging, whether recommendations were personally costly (ex. staying away 
from family gatherings) or largely impersonal (ex. wear a mask in public). Participants were also 
severely deterred from choosing speakers who took a hardline stance against scientists entering 
the policy sphere. Not only do participants want to listen to scientific speakers, but they also 
avoid those who would push them out of the political process completely. These results are 
consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis (2) and run parallel to the findings in the factorial 
experiment. 
 
5.2: Summary and Further Research 
In summation, this thesis has explored questions that go to the core of our modern 
struggles: a public health crisis, declining trust in politicians, the rise of the technocrat, and 
increasingly vicious debate between stakeholders. By way of a two-part survey experiment, this 
exploration has found evidence to suggest that the public prefers scientists to politicians when it 
comes to receiving public health recommendations; and that the effects of attack rhetoric 
directed toward the scientific community seem, on the whole, to undermine legitimacy of the 
attacker rather than the attacked party. That being said, there are nuances involved in the latter 
statement—notable groups have been identified as uniquely susceptible to attack rhetoric, such 
as those who identify as Independents. In an increasingly polarized, party-driven election culture, 
Independents are key swing votes; and their susceptibility could be electorally consequential if 
they are exposed to a candidate with strong tendencies to engage in conflict rhetoric. 
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Further research is needed on these, and other, susceptible subgroups. While the public 
on the whole may be able to hold their opinions firm in the face of attack rhetoric, subsets of the 
public may not. A larger body of literature on the effects of attack rhetoric on listeners is another 
avenue of promise—the area is largely understudied, and conflict rhetoric only continues to grow 
more salient in our political landscape. As suggested by Knudsen and Johannesson (2019), 
conjoint experiments are particularly well-suited to tackle these multidimensional 
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A. Soft Launch on MTurk 
 
Prior to launching the survey full-scale, I conducted a “soft-launch” on Amazon’s MTurk 
platform consisting of 20 participants (~3% of the targeted 601 participants). Reward per 
participant was $1.65, and with 40% fee paid to Amazon, one worker’s time totaled $2.31. This 
pilot study was essential to ensure that all pieces of the survey were running as they were 
intended to. Important insights from the soft launch led to minor changes implemented in the 
final survey design. 
Time spent per participant varied widely, with the quickest passing response submitted in 
15 minutes and the slowest in 54 minutes. The average time spent was 1654.7 seconds, or around 
27 minutes. This average was much higher than the anticipated 10 to 15 minutes. Sorting 
participants by velocity on MTurk, only 9 participants completed the survey within 15 minutes 
or less, and of those 9, only 2 passed quality checks. In an attempt to maintain an hourly pricing 
rate above platform average and to be respectful of participants’ time, I made changes to 
streamline the survey (ex. consolidated instruction pages), and I adjusted the time estimate given 
to workers to 20 minutes. 
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Work time of the 20 passing participants in the soft launch. 
 
One striking finding from the soft launch was the high numbers of participants who did 
not pass the comprehension checks. Out of the total 31 respondents who attempted the survey, 11 
were failed out of the study when asked questions to assess their basic comprehension of the 
scientific stimulus in Part I. Participants who fail these checks are rendered ineligible for 
payment. To respect participants’ time, however, these comprehension checks fall around five 
minutes into the survey, and the survey is designed to immediately terminate participation for 
those who do not pass. 
It should also be noted that all participants who passed comprehension checks at the 
outset of the survey also passed an attention check embedded in the following Likert scale 
questions. Thus, it seems that those who passed comprehension checks tended to be high-quality 
survey respondents on both an understanding and attention level. 
However, early termination of respondents’ survey process posed new concerns around 
process, generalizability, and ethics. First, a high exclusion rate at the outset of the survey led to 
apprehension regarding ability to gather enough passing survey respondents in a reasonable time 
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frame. Collection time for 20 high-quality responses totaled around 5 hours. Identification and 
subsequent rejection of payment requests for the 11 non-passing participants was performed by 
hand and was time-consuming.  
Second, such a high exclusion rate (just over 35%) sparked a worry that the 
comprehension checks were overzealous, so to speak. In other words, perhaps they were weeding 
out not only careless participants, but also participants who missed the questions for other salient 
reasons. Further, because the demographics question section was the last of the survey in the 
soft-launch iteration, I was unable to identify relevant metrics describing participants who failed 
comprehension checks. For example, perhaps respondents with lower education levels were 
failing the comprehension checks at disproportionate rates. If this were the case, failure could be 
chalked up to, perhaps, less-developed reading skills rather than participant inattention. Without 
this information on excluded participants, the generalizability of survey data to the broader 
population comes under threat and selection bias is introduced (Berinsky, Margolis & Sances 
2014). 
To work toward remedying the latter issue, I moved key demographic questions to the 
front end of the survey. Therefore, if participants fail later comprehension questions, I retain data 
regarding their age, gender, ethnicity, education level, partisan affiliation, and ideological 
affiliation. Baseline questions that carry priming risk— “How frequently do you wear a mask in 
public?” “How familiar are you with official CDC/WHO guidelines for the use of masks after 
vaccination?”—remain at the end of the survey. 
In an attempt to narrow the net of the comprehension checks, I adjusted wording and 
display of questions and stimuli to make them as clear as possible. Removal of comprehension 
checks seemed extreme: it is hard to justify the inclusion of participants who cannot name the 
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topic they are supposed to be considering, let alone to interpret the data they produce (i.e., how 
meaningful is their data if they cannot recognize the public health recommendation under 
discussion?). Instead, I employed bolding and underlining to draw attention to relevant pieces of 
information in the stimulus. In the wake of many email inquiries from rejected participants 
inquiring why their reward was denied, I also added a warning to participants that their survey 
would be terminated if they failed the comprehension checks, and that they would be rendered 
ineligible for compensation. New statements in the survey remind participants that they can use 
the “Back” button at any time to review the stimulus, and answers to the comprehension checks 
are taken verbatim from the stimulus. 
 
 





















C. Factorial Experiment: Mean Responses by Conditions 
 
Individual conditions, means                               Grouped conditions (4 v 4), means 
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D. STUDY SCRIPT 
 
Welcome to this study. It will involve two parts and will require around 15-25 minutes of your time. We 




Before getting started, please read the following consent document. If you would still like to participate in this 
study, click the button below to begin. 
Investigators' statement 
We are asking you to be in a research study sponsored by the Political Science department at Columbia University. 
The purpose of this consent form is to give you the information you will need to help you decide whether or not to 
be in the study. Please read the form carefully. You may ask questions about the purpose of the research, what we 
would ask you to do, the possible risks and benefits, your rights as a volunteer, and anything else about the research 
or this form that is not clear. When all your questions have been answered, you can decide if you want to be in the 
study or not. This process is called ‘informed consent.’ 
PURPOSE 
You will be participating in a research activity, the purpose of which is to learn about the interaction between 
political speech and scientific speech, particularly related to COVID-19 spread-reduction efforts. This survey is 
being conducted for academic purposes only, and not for the specific benefit of any candidate, group, or political 
party. 
PROCEDURES 
This research activity will be conducted on Conjoint.ly, a survey platform. It will have two parts, the first of which 
will last 5-10 minutes and the second of which will last 10-15 minutes. Time involved in participation totals around 
15-25 minutes. The first part of the survey will ask you to read two short paragraphs--one from a hypothetical 
scientist and another from a hypothetical politician--and report your level of agreement to follow-up statements 
about the stimulus. The second part of the survey will present you with brief statements by hypothetical speakers 
supporting a recommendation, and will ask you to choose the statement you find most compelling. Participants will 
also be presented with basic demographic questions (such as age, gender, and political affiliation). Subjects may 
refuse to answer any question or item on the survey. 
RISKS, STRESS, OR DISCOMFORT 
This research activity poses no foreseeable risks, stress, or discomfort to participants. 
BENEFITS 
Regarding societal benefits, this data will yield valuable information about the types of messages we are most apt to 
trust during crisis situations, and the mechanisms that erode this trust. Such insights can be applied when crafting the 
most convincing, effective crisis-response messages for the public. Regarding personal benefits to individual 
participants, there is likely no direct benefit to participating in this study. 
OTHER INFORMATION 
All data collected from the survey is anonymous and will be stored on a password-protected server. You may refuse 
to participate or may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
otherwise entitled. You will receive a reward of $1.65 upon completion of the survey. 
PARTICIPATION 
Participation in research is entirely voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from participation at any 
time without jeopardizing your employment, student status or any other entitlements. The investigator may 
withdraw you at his/her professional discretion. 
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ALTERNATIVES TO PARTICIPATION 
No alternatives other than non-participation are available to participants. 
PRIVATE INFORMATION 
Any information derived from this research project that personally identifies you will not be voluntarily released or 
disclosed without your separate consent, except as specifically required by law. Data will be anonymized as it is 
collected, and it will be stored on a password-protected server. None of your answers can be traced back to you. 
The following individuals and/or agencies will be able to look at and copy your research records: 
- The investigator, study staff and other professionals who may be evaluating the study 
- Authorities from Columbia University, including the Institutional Review Board ('IRB') 
- The United States Office of Human Research Protections ('OHRP') 
CONTACT INFORMATION 
If at any time you have questions regarding the research or your participation, you should contact the researcher, 
Helen Sayegh, who will answer all questions. She can be reached at hls2161@columbia.edu. You should also 
contact the investigator or a member of the research staff if you have any concerns or complaints about the research. 
If at any time you have comments regarding the conduct of this research or questions about your rights as a research 
participant, you should contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) Administrator at (212) 305-5883. 
 
 
Before beginning the survey, we would like you to please answer a few brief questions about yourself. 
Click the button below to view the first question. 
 
Q: What is your age? 
A: [Box input] years 
 
Q: Please specify your gender. 
A: Male, Female, Transgender Female, Transgender Male, Non-Binary, Prefer to Self-Describe [box], Prefer Not to 
Answer 
 
Q: Please specify your ethnicity. 
A: American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African American, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific 
Islander, White, Other 
 
Q: What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? 
A: Some high school, high school diploma, some college, vocational training, Associate degree Bachelor’s degree, 
Master’s degree, Professional degree, Doctorate degree 
  
 
Q: Political affiliation: Do you identify as a Democrat, Republican, or Independent/Other? 
A: Democrat, Republican, Independent/Other 
Qa: If Independent/Other: Which party do you generally lean toward? 
  Aa: Democrat…Neither…Republican 
Qb: If Democrat, Republican: How strongly do you identify with this party? 
 Ab: Not strongly at all…Very strongly (5-point scale) 
 
Q: Ideological affiliation: Which ideology do you identify with most closely? 
A: Liberal…Conservative (Likert) 
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PART I: You will first be presented with a short paragraph describing a public health recommendation and the 
scientific reasoning behind that recommendation. Then, you will be presented with a politician’s hypothetical 
response to the recommendation. Finally, you will be asked to rate how strongly you agree or disagree with 
follow-up statements. 
Please click the button below to continue on to read the public health recommendation and scientific 
reasoning behind it. 
 
 
The following excerpt has been modified from a news article. 
 
"Amidst a global death toll exceeding 1.5 million, the scientific community was able to develop and start 
distributing COVID-19 vaccines that boast efficacy rates exceeding 90%. 
Still, leading scientist Dr. Travis Trevor has issued statements urging people to continue wearing a mask, 
even after vaccination. 
In support of the recommendation to continue wearing masks even after vaccination, Dr. Trevor cited the 
following three reasons: 
1. The real world does not mimic a controlled clinical trial. Factors such as how the vaccine is stored, 
transported, and administered (as well as the health of an individual) can affect real-world 
effectiveness of the vaccine. 
2. The duration of vaccine immunity is unknown. The length of vaccine coverage is yet to be 
determined and will be monitored as vaccination campaigns are rolled out. The good news is that our 
immune system’s memory cells have been shown to persist beyond six months in certain patients 
infected with COVID-19. 
3. The herd immunity threshold for COVID-19 is unknown. Herd immunity occurs when enough of 
the population is exposed to the virus, typically through vaccination, and limits the ability of the virus 
to spread. The percentage of population requiring immunization to achieve herd immunity varies by 
disease. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the herd immunity threshold for 
COVID-19 has yet to be established."1 
 
Please answer the following two questions to check your understanding of what you have just read. 
Warning: If you answer either of these two questions incorrectly, the survey will terminate immediately and 
you will not be eligible for compensation. Feel free to use the 'Back' button below to refresh your memory as 
needed. All the information you need is in the paragraph you have just read. 
 
Q: What is the public health recommendation Dr. Trevor described in the text you have just read? 
A: [Multiple Choice] 
- Avoid large public gatherings 
- Wear a mask even after COVID-19 vaccination 
- Get the COVID-19 vaccine 
 
Q: According to what you’ve read, what are Dr. Trevor’s reasons behind this public health recommendation? 
A: [Multiple Choice] 
- The real world does not mimic a controlled clinical trial. 
                                                        
1 Statements are excerpted/modified from https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wear-mask-covid-19-
vaccine/story?id=74858114 
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- The duration of vaccine immunity is unknown. 
- The herd immunity threshold for COVID-19 is unknown. 
- All of the above 
 
Next, you will be presented with a politician's hypothetical response to the public health recommendation and 
scientific reasoning you have just read. 
Click the button below to read the politician's response. 
 
 
CONDITION 1: AGREE // REPUBLICAN // PRAISE 
Republican Senator Steven Smith echoed Dr. Trevor’s statements, asking his constituents to continue wearing masks 
after being vaccinated. “The scientific community and the data they produce tell us that we should still be wearing 
masks in public, even after vaccination that is 90% effective—and that is precisely the course of action I urge my 
constituents to take. We should look to the brilliant scientific community in these situations, and highly competent 
experts like Dr. Trevor should be at the forefront of these policy decisions.” 
 
CONDITION 2: AGREE // REPUBLICAN // ATTACK 
Republican Senator Steven Smith echoed Dr. Trevor’s statements, asking his constituents to continue wearing masks 
after being vaccinated. “The scientific community and the data they produce tell us that we should still be wearing 
masks in public, even after vaccination that is 90% effective—and that is precisely the course of action I urge my 
constituents to take. Still, though I agree with this recommendation, I think that scientists belong in the lab, not in 
politics. And this particular scientist, Travis Trevor, is foolish. If the scientists have it their way, we would be in 
masks forever.” 
 
CONDITION 3: AGREE // DEMOCRATIC // PRAISE 
Democratic Senator Steven Smith echoed Dr. Trevor’s statements, asking his constituents to continue wearing 
masks after being vaccinated. “The scientific community and the data they produce tell us that we should still be 
wearing masks in public, even after vaccination that is 90% effective—and that is precisely the course of action I 
urge my constituents to take. We should look to the brilliant scientific community in these situations, and highly 
competent experts like Dr. Trevor should be at the forefront of these policy decisions.” 
 
CONDITION 4: AGREE // DEMOCRATIC // ATTACK 
Democratic Senator Steven Smith echoed Dr. Trevor’s statements, asking his constituents to continue wearing 
masks after being vaccinated. “The scientific community and the data they produce tell us that we should still be 
wearing masks in public, even after vaccination that is 90% effective—and that is precisely the course of action I 
urge my constituents to take. Still, though I agree with this recommendation, I think that scientists belong in the lab, 
not in politics. And this particular scientist, Travis Trevor, is foolish. If the scientists have it their way, we would be 
in masks forever.” 
 
CONDITION 5: DISAGREE // REPUBLICAN // PRAISE 
Republican Senator Steven Smith disagreed with Dr. Trevor’s statements, discouraging his constituents from 
wearing masks after being vaccinated. “The scientific community and the data they produce tell us that we should 
still be wearing masks in public, even after vaccination that is 90% effective—but I do not think that is the right way 
to go. Still, though I disagree with this particular recommendation, I do think that we should look to the brilliant 
scientific community in these situations, and highly competent experts like Dr. Trevor should be at the forefront of 
policy decisions.” 
 
CONDITION 6: DISAGREE // REPUBLICAN // ATTACK 
Republican Senator Steven Smith disagreed with Dr. Trevor’s statements, discouraging his constituents from 
wearing masks after being vaccinated. “The scientific community and the data they produce tell us that we should 
still be wearing masks in public, even after vaccination that is 90% effective—but I do not think that is the right way 
to go. Scientists belong in the lab, not in politics. Travis Trevor is foolish, and this recommendation is a disaster. If 
the scientists have it their way, we would be in masks forever.” 
 
CONDITION 7: DISAGREE // DEMOCRAT // PRAISE 
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Democratic Senator Steven Smith disagreed with Dr. Trevor’s statements, discouraging his constituents from 
wearing masks after being vaccinated. “The scientific community and the data they produce tell us that we should 
still be wearing masks in public, even after vaccination that is 90% effective—but I do not think that is the right way 
to go. Still, though I disagree with this particular recommendation, I do think that we should look to the brilliant 
scientific community in these situations, and highly competent experts like Dr. Trevor should be at the forefront of 
policy decisions.” 
 
CONDITION 8: DISAGREE // DEMOCRAT // ATTACK 
Democratic Senator Steven Smith disagreed with Dr. Trevor’s statements, discouraging his constituents from 
wearing masks after being vaccinated. “The scientific community and the data they produce tell us that we should 
still be wearing masks in public, even after vaccination that is 90% effective—but I do not think that is the right way 
to go. Scientists belong in the lab, not in politics. Travis Trevor is foolish, and this recommendation is a disaster. If 
the scientists have it their way, we would be in masks forever.” 
 
Keeping in mind the two texts you have read (Dr. Trevor's public health recommendation and Senator Smith's 
response), please rate your level of agreement with the following brief statements. 
Click the button below to view the first statement. 
 
1. Senator Smith is good at his job. 
2. Senator Smith is knowledgeable. 
3. Senator Smith is trustworthy. 
4. Senator Smith is looking out for the best interest of the people he represents. 
5. Dr. Trevor is good at his job. 
6. Dr. Trevor is knowledgeable. 
7. Dr. Trevor is trustworthy. 
8. Dr. Trevor is looking out for the public’s best interest. 
9. If you are paying attention, please select “Strongly Agree.” 
10. Dr. Trevor is a fool. 
11. Dr. Trevor (and scientists like him) should lead the public health policy-making process. 
12. If we listen to the scientists, we will be wearing masks forever. 
13. I agree with Dr. Trevor. 
14. I agree with Senator Smith. 
15. It is important for people to wear a mask after vaccination. 
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PART II: You will be presented with a public health recommendation related to reducing the spread of 
COVID-19. After being presented with the recommendation, you will then be asked to choose between various 
speakers and their arguments for following that recommendation. Your job will be to choose which of the 
speakers' arguments you find most convincing. 
Click the button below to read the public health recommendation. 
 
CONDITION 1:  
 
Please take a moment to read the following public health recommendation. 




Please take a moment to read the following public health recommendation. 
Recommendation: Wear a mask when in public. 
 
CONDITION 3: 
Please take a moment to read the following public health recommendation. 
Recommendation: Receive the COVID-19 vaccine. 
 
CONDITION 4: 
Please take a moment to read the following public health recommendation. 
Recommendation: Businesses should spend money on spread-limiting measures (ex. plexiglass barriers) and 
should reduce capacity. 
 
 
Make sure you are familiar with the public health recommendation you have just read--it will be relevant 
to the next section of questions. 
Imagine you are deciding whether or not to support or follow this recommendation. In the next section of 
questions, you will be presented with three speakers who are in support of the recommendation, and it will be 
your job to choose which speaker is most convincing to you. 
Please read each option carefully, as they may differ from one another only slightly. 
Click the button below to begin choosing. 
 
[Participants are presented with three speaker profiles.] 
 
All of the following speakers express their support for this recommendation. 
If you were deciding whether or not to follow this recommendation, which speaker would you be most 
willing to listen to? 
 
 
Attribute 1: Source 
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 Levels:  
4) Scientist 
5) Democratic Senator 
6) Republican Senator 
 
Attribute 2: Justification 
Levels:  
3) Hard data from scientific studies 
4) “Appeals to ideals” justifications (ex. “soft” justifications having to do with no-harm 
oaths taken by scientists or representative responsibilities for elected officials). 
 
Attribute 3: Attitude toward science 
 Levels: 
4) Pro-scientist: Scientists should lead public health policy-making 
5) Neutral/Middle-ground: Scientists should probably be part of the conversation in 
public health policy-making 
6) Anti-scientist: Scientists belong in the lab, not politics 
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Thank you for answering the previous questions. Before ending the survey, we'd like to ask 4 brief, final 
questions about you. 
Click below to begin the final 4 questions. 
 
Q. How frequently do you wear a mask in public? 
A: All the time…Never (5-point scale) 
 
Q: How familiar are you with existing guidelines for the use of masks after vaccination? 
A: Not at all familiar…Very familiar (5-point scale) 
 
Q: How familiar are you with the state of scientific research with respect to the COVID-19 pandemic? 
A: Not at all familiar…Very familiar (5-point scale) 
 
Q. What are your thoughts on climate change? 
A: It’s a hoax…It’s very real (5-point scale) 
 
 
Thank you for your participation in this study. Please click the button below to save your responses and to 
be eligible for payment. 
 
Debrief 
The purpose of this study is to learn about the interaction between political speech and scientific speech, 
particularly related to COVID-19 spread-reduction efforts. The survey that you have just completed aimed to 
do this by measuring your attitudes toward scientific facts after exposure to varying political statements. Some 
of these statements may have offered “pro-science” views, others “anti-science” views. 
Those political statements were hypothetical—they were manufactured for the purposes of the study, and 
the investigators do not claim to endorse any viewpoints expressed. 
If you would like scientifically-backed, factual information and recommendations regarding the COVID-19 
pandemic, please visit the following links. 
World Health Organization: https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html 
 
If you have further questions or concerns, please contact Investigator Helen Sayegh at hls2161@columbia.edu. 
 
